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either cooperatively, or noncooperatively. We then specify three simple functional forms of
conjectures and analyze the five resulting dynamic systems, in terms of steady states and
convergence conditions. We next further specify these procedures to the case of a game
of groundwater management, using a quadratic functional form for the profit function of
agents. We obtain then explicit expressions for steady states and convergence conditions
for the dynamic systems. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments in order to assess the
“performance” of pairs of agents adopting each of the five behaviors.
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Comportements à court terme, à long terme et apprentissage.
Application à un problème de gestion de nappe phréatique
Résumé : Nous définissons une famille de procédures d’apprentissage conjectural, dans
laquelle les agents formulent des conjectures au sujet de ce que l’adversaire va jouer, en fonc-
tion de leur propre action ou d’une variable d’état. Nous prouvons des propriétés générales
de ces procédures, en les comparant aux deux systèmes dynamiques générés par des agents
myopes qui résolvent à chaque étape un jeu statique, soit de façon coopérative, soit non-
coopérative. Nous spécifions ensuite trois formes fonctionnelles simples pour les conjectures
et nous analysons les cinq systèmes dynamiques ainsi définis, en termes d’états stationnaires et
de conditions de convergence. Puis nous appliquons ces procédures pour un problème de ges-
tion d’une nappe phréatique, en utilisant une forme fonctionnelle quadratique pour la fonction
de profit des agents. Nous obtenons alors des formules explicites pour les états stationnaires
et des conditions de convergence pour les systèmes dynamiques. Finalement, nous menons
des expériences numériques afin d’évaluer les “performances” de paires d’agents qui adoptent
chacun des cinq comportements.
Mots-clés : Théorie des Jeux, Dynamique, Apprentissage, Gestion de Ressources Naturelles
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1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is the modeling of economic agents, endowed with limited knowledge
of their environment, and engaged in a repeated interaction with other agents in a competition
for some resource.
Our initial motivation is the question of the management of Common Pool Resources
(CPRs) such as reserves of water (lakes, groundwater), some populations of wild plants (forests,
pastures), and some populations of wild animals. According to the review of e.g. Madani and
Dinar [8], agents in practical situations do not act as foreseen by the standard game-theoretical
modeling with the well-known Prisonner’s Dilemma. What might then be their way of deciding
what to do?
When faced with a lack of information, agents are constrained to rely on observation and
some form of learning. Many forms indeed exist: for instance Wang et al. [14] review and
classify some of them. Among these, agents may form conjectures on the opponent’s behavior
and adapt this conjecture according to observations. We shall follow this line of research.
Endowing agents with a conjecture on what the opponent does is standard in Game the-
ory. The Conjectural Variations model (see e.g. Figuières et al. [3]) assumes that each agent
believes the opponent reacts to any variation of their actions, and optimizes her utility accord-
ingly. When the observed behaviors match the conjectured ones, the equilibrium obtained is
called consistent. In that situation, neither agent has a reason to modify her belief. Otherwise,
if the interaction is repeated, it is logical for agents to revise their conjecture to get closer to
consistency, thereby learning a consistent conjecture.
This idea was used by Jean-Marie and Tidball [7] in a repeated duopoly game. The
conjecture used was an affine function of the control. An interesting feature was that in some
cases, the conjecture learned can lead to a Pareto optimal outcome, improving the gains with
respect to the Nash equilibrium. Then Quérou and Tidball [11] applied the same principle
and the same conjecture to a dynamic game of resource extraction and Quérou [10] to a game
of pollution control.
In this paper, we continue with this point of view that agents apply a simple reasoning,
based on recently observed data, a form of “limited rationality”. Indeed, limited rational
calculation is expected in a human behavior, see Simon [13]. This is also the idea developed by
Madani and Dinar [8], but in their work they essentially assume that agents try to guess their
opponents’ actions by performing simple statistics on the observations. Our modeling goes
one step further by assuming that agents anticipate that the opponents will play strategically,
either as a function of their own actions, or as a function of the state. These two behaviors
find their inspiration in theoretical results about the use of conjectures in dynamic games.
Indeed, Jean-Marie and Tidball have proved in [6] that consistent state-based conjectures and
Nash-feedback equilibria coincide in discrete-time dynamic games, Fershtman and Kamien
having proved this result in [2] for differential games.
The contribution of the paper is as follows. First, we sketch a general formalism for
dynamic games where players have simple conjectures on the behavior of the opponent (for
simplification we consider the case of two players only), depending on the last observed action
and/or the last observed state. These conjectures are revised if there is a mismatch between
predictions and observations. This principle generates a family of dynamic processes called
Conjectural Learning procedures. In addition to these incomplete information procedures, we
introduce complete-information but nearsighted behaviors in which players repeatedly solve a
game using either the Nash equilibrium solution, or the cooperative solution where the sum
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of profits is maximized. We call the latter the “nearsighted Pareto” solution in the following.
This also generates dynamic processes, characterized by a fixed state-feedback strategy for
each agent. We then establish a general link between the steady states of the first and the
second family. Specifically: conjectural procedures based on the state only have the same
steady states as the nearsighted Nash procedure, whereas conjectural procedures based on the
control, modulo some symmetry assumption, have the same steady states as the nearsighted
Pareto procedure.
Next, we introduce three specific forms of conjectures, including the usual conjecture affine
in the control, the only one used in the literature so far. For each of them, we study existence
and uniqueness of steady states, and we provide conditions for local or global convergence of
the process to these steady states. We proceed similarly for the two nearsighted procedures
already introduced.
We apply this modeling framework to a problem of groundwater exploitation. Water
extraction is the only input in the production process of the farmers, and the dynamics is
given by the evolution of the level of the water table. In order to mitigate the “tragedy of the
commons” typical of such a Common Pool Resource problem when agents are too myopic, we
introduce a subjective valuation of the future in the form of a unit price parameter attached
to the future level of the resource. We specify profits using a quadratic function, which allows
the derivation of explicit formulas and convergence conditions in most of the cases.
Finally, we conduct numerical experiments in order to assess the relative “performance”
of the different complete-information and incomplete-information schemes. We evaluate some
behavior for a pair of players using two metrics: the total discounted profit and the limit
stock of the resource. We also use as benchmark the usual Nash-feedback and cooperative
solutions to the corresponding dynamic game, where individual profits and the sum of profits
are maximized, respectively. We call respectively these two solutions “farsighted Nash” and
“farsighted Pareto”. The experiments reveal that when agents adopt some of the conjectural
learning behavior, their total profit can be compared to the farsighted cooperative solution,
with even a higher level of the asymptotic stock. This is also the case for the nearsighted
schemes. This result however depends on the valuation the agents place on the future stock,
which must be adequately chosen. When this valuation is too small, the performance of these
schemes is worst than that of the farsighted Nash solution, both for profits and the resource.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the different dynamic
models used in the paper. First, the general conjectural learning model (Section 2.1), then the
nearsighted behaviors (Section 2.2), together with results about the links between them and
general convergence results. In Section 2.3, we specify the three specific conjectural learning
procedures and provide results on their steady states and their convergence. Section 3 is
devoted to the analysis of a game of groundwater extraction. The model is specified in general
terms in Section 3.1. The specific case of a quadratic profit function is then fully analyzed
in Section 3.2: the five dynamic systems previously defined are analyzed individually, then
compared. The numerical experiments are reported in Section 4 and perspectives are presented
in Section 5.
Inria
Nearsighted, farsighted behaviors and learning 5
2 The Models
We first present the general principles of conjectures and learning. We next introduce near-
sighted dynamics. Finally, we study some specific functional forms of conjectures.
2.1 A general Learning Model








where the state variable, Ht, evolves according to the dynamics:




Here, at each time period t, wti is Player i’s action. We suppose that functions Fi and G are
differentiable with continuous derivatives.
Suppose also that each player at each period makes a conjecture about the behavior of the







for some differentiable functions χti, i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1.... Here, w
c,t
j is what Player i believes
Player j will play, as a function of her own play wti and the current state H
t. The superscript
“c” stands for “conjectural”. With this assumption on the opponent, choosing the optimal
action, which is originally a game problem, becomes an optimization problem.
Assuming then that Player i solves this problem without considering the future of the
















where Wi(H) represents the constraints of the problem, which is contingent upon the current
state. The solution to the optimization problem (2.4) for i = 1, 2 yields the optimal solution
for both players, (wt∗i , w
t∗
j ) which is the action they will implement. When this solution is

























i ) = 0. (2.5)




t). This conjecture is in general different from wt∗j . Then Player i should revise her









Note that χti is a sequence of functions. In practical situations we are going to consider
particular functional forms for the conjecture, with a certain numbers of parameters. These
1An alternative could be χt+1i = Si(w
0∗
j , H
0, . . . , wt∗j , H
t), meaning that the update of the conjecture is
based on some “statistic” (hence “S”) performed on all the observations. We shall not develop this alternative
here.
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parameters are going to be learned in the learning procedure. In (2.6), the parameters are
updated (hence “U”) based on the most recent observation of the opponent. Indeed, the thesis
of this work is that agents will construct their decision based on the most recent data, and
not engage in more complex data processing and machine learning.
When it is repeated over time, this learning procedure produces a dynamical system with






j), specified by equations (2.2), (2.4) and (2.6). This construction
is formalized in the following definition. For the purpose of mathematical statements, it is
assumed that the space of conjecture functions χti is equipped with some topology. In the
examples we shall develop, these functions will typically be in a class of parametric functions,
and assimilated to some subset of Rn.
Definition 1 (Conjectural Learning). A Conjectural Learning procedure (shortened as CLP)






j), specified by equations (2.2), (2.4)
and (2.6). A Conjectural Learning procedure is called
well-defined if Problem (2.4) has a unique solution for each i = 1, 2 and every t = 0, 1, . . .
We then denote with sol ci (χti, H
t) this solution for Player i.
regular if a) the functions sol ci are continuous in their variables, and b) the update functional
Ui is continuous in its variables.
consistent if there is no update of the conjecture when, and only when the observation of the
agent matches her conjecture: formally, if
Ui(χi, wi, wj , H) = χi ⇐⇒ wj = χi(wi, H).
We now state a result that applies to the general learning procedure just exposed.
Proposition 1. Assume a well-defined, regular and consistent Conjectural Learning procedure












∞) i 6= j (2.7)









∞) i = 1, 2 . (2.9)
In particular, if the solution of (2.4) when Ht = H∞ is interior, and if functions χ∞i , i = 1, 2,
















∞) = 0. (2.10)






j) converges. Since (2.2) holds




i, Ht) for ev-
ery t and solci is assumed to be continuous (regularity), (2.9) holds in the limit. Like-
wise, since (2.6) holds for every t and Ui is continuous (regularity), in the limit we have:
Ui(χ∞i , w∞i , w∞j , H∞) = χ∞i . Then, by consistency, this implies w∞j = χ∞i (w∞i , H∞), which
is (2.7).
Remark 1. When solutions to (2.4) are unique (well-defined CLP) and interior, the continuity
of the partial derivatives appearing in (2.5) implies the continuity of solci (regularity, part a)).
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2.2 Nearsighted behaviors with complete information
We now introduce two models of “almost myopic” agents, which we call nearsighted. In these
models, agents consider their immediate revenue given by Equation (2.1). With this gain
function in mind, assumed common knowledge, the players choose to play non-cooperatively
(maximizing their individual profit) or cooperatively (maximizing the joint profit). We study
both alternatives in the following sections. Those behaviors will be taken as comparison
benchmarks for conjectural learning behaviors.
2.2.1 Definitions
The game or optimization problem solved at each time step t depends only on the state
variable Ht. As in Definition 1, we call “well-defined” the situation where this solution exists
and is unique for each value of Ht. Denote with soli(Ht), i = 1, 2, this nearsighted solution.
Taking into account the dynamics (2.2) and repeating the nearsighted solution at each period
of time, this generates a dynamic system with generic equations:
wti = soli(H
t) i = 1, 2, (2.11)




This construction is formalized with the following definition.
Definition 2 (Nearsighted Scheme). A Nearsighted Scheme is a dynamical system with vari-
ables (wti , w
t
j , H
t), specified by Equations (2.11) and (2.12).
A Nearsighted Scheme is called
well-defined if the function soli(Ht), solution of the game problem at state t, exists and is
unique for each i = 1, 2 and every t = 0, 1, . . .;
regular if the functions soli(·) are continuous.
We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of this system and its relationship with the
learning procedure of Section 2.1.
2.2.2 Nearsighted vs Myopic
The kind of behavior we are considering here is usually called “myopic”, because it does not
take into account the dynamics. We use the term “nearsighted” to refer to the feature that
players can take into account the near future in their optimization program. Indeed, assume













where Ht+1 is given by the dynamics in (2.2), namely Ht+1 = G(wti , w
t
j , H
t), Si(·) can be
interpreted as a “scrap” value function and ρ as a discount factor.
One interpretation is that Player i optimizes some immediate objective function πi, plus
some gain depending on the future of the resource Ht+1. This gain represents the subjective
perception that the agent’s future gains somehow depend on the state of the resource. The
agents however do not think as far as trying to solve a multiple-stage optimization or game
problem. As a particular case, when S(·) = 0 we have the usual myopic situation.
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Remark 2. When agents optimize a profit function of the form (2.13) with a scrap value
different from zero and they maximize step by step as presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.1,
we say that they have a nearsighted behavior. Section 2.1 deals with nearsighted behavior
with incomplete information: the agents do not know the profit function of the other player.
Section 2.2.1 deals with nearsighted behavior with complete information.
2.2.3 Non cooperative nearsighted equilibrium
In this situation, suppose that the players play a non cooperative game, i.e. at each period t








t), i = 1, 2. (2.14)
We call this behavior the nearsighted Nash equilibrium. Supposing interior solutions for all t,





j , H) = 0, i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2, . . . (2.15)
This defines the functions soli(H) in (2.11), denoted here solNi .
Remark 3. In the results that follow, we are going to consider only the case where solutions
are interior and unique. Some of these results may still hold when players have independent
constraints on their strategy: we prefer to avoid the technicalities for this first study. When
constraints exist, and especially when these constraints are coupling, it is well-known that
multiple Nash equilibria may exist. Some equilibrium selection, such as Rosen’s solution [12],
may be needed, both for a proper definition of the solution, and for guaranteeing convergence
of iterative schemes.
Then we have the first result:
Proposition 2. If the Nearsighted scheme, where the solutions sol Ni are defined by (2.14) is











∞), i = 1, 2. (2.17)






∞) = 0, i = 1, 2. (2.18)
Proof. The proof is obvious taking into account the continuity of the function G and that of
soli.
Remark 4. When the solution of (2.14) is unique (well defined scheme) and interior, the con-
tinuity of partial derivative appearing in the first-order conditions (2.15) implies the continuity
of soli (regularity), and (2.18).
Comparing with Proposition 1, we have the following corollary.
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Proposition 3 (Convergence of conjectural learning to a nearsighted Nash steady state).
Consider a Conjectural Learning procedure as in Definition 1, well-defined, regular and con-





j ), where the
solution is interior. Then this limit is a steady state of the Nearsighted Scheme with Nash










c∞) = 0, i = 1, 2.
Proof. The results from the comparison of Propositions 1 and 2. If the Conjectural Learning

















If either of the conditions ∂χc∞i /∂wi = 0 or ∂Fi/∂wj = 0 holds, it reduces to (2.15). In
addition the limit solves Equation (2.16) since it coincides with (2.8). Therefore, the limit is
a fixed point of the Nash nearsighted scheme. Conversely, for such a fixed point to satisfy
(2.10), it is required that ∂χc∞i /∂wi × ∂Fi/∂wj = 0, hence the condition.
This proposition in particular says that, if the conjecture depends only on the evolution
of the state variable and if the learning process converges to some interior fixed point, then it
must converge to the interior nearsighted Nash steady state. In that case indeed, ∂χti/∂wi = 0
for all t and this is reasonable to expect the same property at the limit.
It also applies to the case where, for each player i, the function Fi does not depend on the
opponent’s action at all: ∂Fi/∂wj = 0, i 6= j. In that case, the conjecture is of course useless.
2.2.4 Cooperative nearsighted solution




















We call this solution the nearsighted cooperative, or nearsighted Pareto solution.




(wi, wj , H) +
∂Fj
∂wi
(wi, wj , H) = 0, i = 1, 2. (2.20)
This defines the functions soli(H) of (2.11), denoted here solPi . As before, we call “well-defined”
the situation where this solution exists and is unique for all H.
If the dynamic procedure converges we have
Proposition 4. If the Nearsighted scheme, where the solutions sol Pi are defined by (2.20) is











∞), i = 1, 2. (2.21)












∞) = 0, i = 1, 2. (2.22)
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Proof. The proof is obvious taking into account the continuity of the function G, that of
solPi and that of the partial derivatives appearing in the first-order conditions (2.20), and the
dynamics at the steady state.
Comparing with Proposition 1, we have the following result.
Proposition 5 (Convergence of Conjectural Learning to a Nearsighted cooperative steady
state). Consider a Conjectural Learning procedure as in Proposition 1 which is well-defined,





















c∞) = 1 i = 1, 2,
then this limit is an interior steady state of the Nearsighted Scheme with the cooperative solu-
tion.































for each i = 1, 2, which is just (2.22). The limit is therefore a steady-state of the cooperative
Nearsighted Scheme.
This proposition says, in particular, that if both the learning scheme and the nearsighted
Pareto scheme converge, if solutions are interior, and if the game is symmetric with a conjecture
of the type χi(w) = w+β, the learning process converges to the nearsighted cooperative steady
state. See the forthcoming Propositions 10 and 11.
2.2.5 Convergence
The convergence of a nearsighted scheme reduces to the convergence of the recurrence, obtained
by combining (2.11) and (2.12):
Ht+1 = G(soli(Ht), solj(Ht), Ht) .
Accordingly, a sufficient condition for convergence to a fixed point of this equation, is the
following.
Inria
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Proposition 6 (Convergence of nearsighted schemes). A sufficient condition for the local
convergence of a nearsighted procedure to an interior steady state H∞ is:∣∣∣∣∂soli∂H (H∞) ∂G∂wi + ∂solj∂H (H∞) ∂G∂wj + ∂G∂H
∣∣∣∣ < 1, (2.23)
the partial derivatives of G being evaluated at (soli(H∞), solj(H∞), H∞).
Proof. The recurrence can be described asHt+1 = f(Ht) and it is well-known that |f ′(H∞)| <
1 is a sufficient condition for local convergence. See e.g. [4, Theorem 6.5].
2.3 Some affine conjectures and their relationship with nearsightedness
In this section, we study several particular functional forms of conjectures. We provide char-
acterizations of the steady states of the corresponding Conjectural Learning procedures, and
discuss when these steady states correspond to those of Nearsighted procedures. We also
provide sufficient conditions for convergence of the learning procedures.
Some results hold when players are symmetric, a situation which we now define formally.
Definition 3 (Symmetric players). The players are called symmetric if Fi(wi, wj , H) =
Fj(wj , wi, H)
2 for all values of wi, wj and H.
2.3.1 Affine conjecture on w
We now turn to the most usual functional form in the literature (see [7, 11]) where the function
χi depends linearly on wi only:
wcj = χi(wi) := w̄j + βi(wi − w̄i), i 6= j. (2.24)
Here, w̄ = (w̄1, w̄2) is some given (common knowledge) reference value and βi is the supposed
sensitivity of Player j to actions of Player i. This parameter is going to evolve with the
learning processes with an update as in (2.6). We specify this update now.
Player i plays wi, assumes that Player j will play as in (2.24) and optimizes her action w∗i .
When she looks at the real action of Player j, w∗j , she “realizes” that her conjecture should
have been










and she revises his learning procedure as follows






for some learning factor µi ∈ (0, 1]. This process is initialized with some given β0i , i = 1, 2.
The actions played at step t are obtained solving (2.5). This results in a dynamic system
2Note that when the scrap value is non zero this definition implies symmetry in objective gain and also in
dynamics.
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involving variables (wt∗i , w
t∗
j , H
t, βti , β
t
j). Note that this process is consistent (see Definition
1), because here, χi = Ui(χi, wi, wj , H) means




and since µi > 0, this is equivalent to βi(w∗i − w̄i) = w∗j − w̄j , which, in view of (2.24), means
w∗j = χi(w
∗
i ). This consistency, of course, results from the way the value β
′
i was constructed.
Lemma 1. Assume that the Conjectural Learning procedure specified above is well-defined, reg-
ular and converges to some limit (w∞∗i , w
∞∗
j , H
∞, β∞i , β
∞




j = 1 and χi(w
∞
i ) =
w∞j . Assume in addition that w
∞∗





Proof. The first part of the statement follows from (2.25) and the continuity of the solutions
w∗i = sol
c
i (βi, H) (assumption on regularity). Indeed, under the convergence assumption, the
ratio (wt∗j − w̄j)/(wt∗i − w̄i) converges to β∞i , even if w∞∗i = w̄i. Then the identity β∞i β∞j = 1
is obvious. The second identity also follows from (2.25) after multiplication by wt∗i − w̄i. The
third one is equivalent to it when wt∗i 6= w̄i.
Applying Proposition 5, we can deduce the following result.








for all w and H. Consider the Conjectural Learning procedure specified above with w̄i = w̄j.












j = 1. Finally, assume that the cooperative nearsighted
procedure is well-defined.
Then, the limit of the CLP is the cooperative nearsighted steady state.
Proof. If the CLP converges with w∞i = w
∞
j = w















(w∞, w∞, H∞) +
∂Fi
∂wj
(w∞, w∞, H∞)β∞i .




(w∞, w∞, H∞) +
∂Fj
∂wi
(w∞, w∞, H∞) .
In other words, (w∞, w∞, H∞) solves Equation (2.22). Since the procedure is assumed to be
well defined, this equation has a unique solution, so the statement is proved.
We now state convergence results for this Conjectural Learning procedure.
Inria
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Proposition 8. Consider a symmetric Conjectural Learning procedure with conjectures as
in (2.24). Denote with r(β,H) the common reaction function, solution to (2.5), the solution
of Problem (2.4) being assumed interior. Assume r is continuous and differentiable. Assume
further that the values βi = 1, i = 1, 2, wi = wj = w∞ and H∞ solve the fixed-point equations.





















∈ (−1, 1) (2.27)
µi(1 + 2 max(ω, 0)) < 2 for i = 1, 2, (2.28)
1 + 2 min(ω, 0) > 0, (2.29)
where the functions are evaluated at (β∞1 , β
∞
2 , H
∞) = (1, 1, H∞), then the procedure is locally
convergent around this steady state.
The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix A.2.
Observe that Condition (2.28) can be realized by choosing µi small enough. However,
Condition (2.29) might not be satisfiable if ω is negative and large. On the contrary, it is
trivially satisfied if ω ≥ 0.
When symmetry is even greater, then convergence of the subsequence βt always occurs,
as stated in the following result.
Proposition 9. Consider the Conjectural Learning procedure defined in this section, under
the assumption of symmetry defined in Definition 3 with in addition w̄i = w̄j and β0i = β
0
j . If
the property (2.27) holds, then the procedure converges locally and β∞i = β
∞
j = 1.
Proof. The proof proceeds as in that of Proposition 4.5 in [7]. Under the assumptions, wt∗i =
wt∗j for all t, and it follows that the recurrence β
t+1
i = (1−µi)βti+µi becomes independent of the
other variables. It converges to 1 because µi ∈ (0, 1]. Then, in the fixed point (1, 1, H∞), the
dynamic system behaves as the one-dimensional recurrence Ht+1 = G(r(1, Ht), r(1, Ht), Ht),
and (2.27) is sufficient for its local convergence (see also the proof of Proposition 6).
2.3.2 Conjecture “imitate w”
Assume here that the conjecture takes the form:
wcj = χi(w,H) := wi + βi, i 6= j. (2.30)
Player i thinks that her opponent will just copy her value, up to some constant: hence the
name “imitate w” we give to this conjecture. Then the adjustment mechanism of the conjecture










so that, using the same adjustment method as in Section 2.3.1,







for some µi ∈ (0, 1]. This defines a Conjectural Learning procedure as in Section 2.1. This
procedure is consistent: by construction, βt+1i = β
t






i . Then it
easily follows that:
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Lemma 2. Assume that the Conjectural Learning procedure specified above is well-defined,
regular and converges to some limit (w∞∗i , w
∞∗
j , H
∞, β∞i , β
∞
j ), not necessarily interior. Then:
β∞i = w
∞∗
j − w∞∗i , χi(w∞∗i , H∞) = w∞∗j , β∞i + β∞j = 0.
Considering Proposition 5, we have the following result.
Proposition 10. Assume that players are symmetric as in Definition 3. Consider the Con-
jectural Learning procedure specified above. Assume it is well-defined, regular and converges to
some interior limit (w∞∗i , w
∞∗
j , H
∞, β∞i , β
∞
j ). Finally, assume that the cooperative nearsighted
procedure is well-defined.
Then, the limit of the CLP is the cooperative nearsighted steady state.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Proposition 5, because the CLP is consistent, the players
are symmetric and ∂χi/∂wi(w,H) = 1 for all values of w and H.
Proposition 11. Consider a symmetric Conjectural Learning procedure with conjectures as
in (2.30). Denote with r(β,H) the common reaction function, solution to (2.5), the solution
of Problem (2.4) being assumed interior. Assume further that the values βi = βj = 0, wi =
wj = w


















∈ (−1, 1) (2.27)
µi(1 + 2 max(ω, 0)) < 2 for i = 1, 2, (2.32)
1 + 2 min(ω, 0) > 0, (2.33)
where the functions are evaluated at (β∞1 , β
∞
2 , H
∞) = (0, 0, H∞), then the procedure is locally
convergent around this steady state.
The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix A.3.
Observe that Condition (2.32) can be realized by choosing µi small enough, and that if
ω ≤ 0, it is trivially satisfied for any µi ≤ 1. However, Condition (2.33) might not be satisfiable
if ω is negative and large. On the contrary, it is trivially satisfied if ω ≥ 0.
2.3.3 Affine conjecture on H
Another possibility is to assume that the function χi depends linearly on H only. We adopt
the general form:
wcj = χi(H) := w̄j + βi(H − H̄i) i 6= j. (2.34)
In that form, the quantity H̄i can be interpreted as a reference level proper of Player i, with
respect to which deviations are, supposedly, observed by Player j. As in the previous section,
the parameter βi is the subject of learning. The other values H̄i and w̄j are parameters
assumed to be fixed and of common knowledge.
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Here, the update procedure takes the following form. After observing the value w∗j played





so that the update is:






Again, this procedure is consistent: by construction, βt+1i = β
t
i if and only if w
∗t
j = w̄j +
βti(H
t − H̄i). Accordingly, we have the result:
Lemma 3. Assume that the Conjectural Learning procedure specified above is well-defined,
regular and converges to some limit (w∞∗i , w
∞∗
j , H
∞, β∞i , β
∞
j ) such that H






From Proposition 3 we have the following result:
Proposition 12. Consider a Conjectural Learning procedure with a conjecture of the form
(2.34), which is well-defined and regular. Assume that Equation (2.18) has unique solution.
Then if the Conjectural Learning procedure converges, it does to the nearsighted Nash steady
state.
We conclude this section with a sufficient condition for convergence.
Proposition 13. Consider a symmetric Conjectural Learning procedure with conjectures as
in (2.34). Denote with r(β,H) the common reaction function, solution to (2.5), the solution
of Problem (2.4) being assumed interior. Let (β∞, β∞, w∞, w∞, H∞) solve the fixed-point









































∣∣∣∣) > −1 (2.37)
|ω1|+ λ|β∞ − ω2| < 1, (2.38)
where the functions are evaluated at (β∞, β∞, H∞), then the procedure is locally convergent
around this steady state.
The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix A.4.
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2.4 Farsighted behaviors with complete information
Assuming players have complete information on the profit function of their opponent, they
can opt for one of the infinite-horizon solutions, which we call here “farsighted”. We shall
consider two standard solutions: the Nash feedback and the cooperative (or “Pareto optimal”)
solution.































Remark 5. Note that in the farsighted solutions, the instantaneous gain function only con-
siders the objective gain πi(wti , w
t
j , H
t). The subjective part of the gain, that is, the term
ρSi(H
t+1) in (2.13), is not really earned by the player.
We do not discuss further the computation and the properties of the farsighted solutions
in this general case. We only require that they exist and are unique. More details will be
given in the application.
3 A groundwater exploitation problem
We consider as application a groundwater exploitation problem, inspired by Provencher and
Burt [9]. In the following sections, we introduce the model, then apply the mechanisms
described in Section 2.
3.1 The general model
Water extraction is the only input in the production process of two farmers, and the dynamics
is given by the evolution of the level of the water table. We adopt the simple reservoir model:
Ht+1 = G(wti , w
t
j , H
t) = Ht +R− α(wti + wtj), (3.1)
where R is the annual recharge (assumed constant) and α ∈ (0, 1] is a return flow coefficient.
Farmers face strategic interactions in this model in two possible distinct ways. First, if
the pumping cost is made to depend on the height of the water table during or at the end of
the time period, then the whole profit function (revenue minus costs) depends on the action
of the opponent. Second, as mentioned in Section 2.2.2, farmers can also take into account
the future state of the resource in their (subjective) utility evaluation.


















Ht + θ(R− α(wti + wtj)
)
+ ργi(H
t +R− α(wti + wtj)).
(3.2)
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The first term Pi(wti) represents the objective revenue from the crop when the quantity of
water wti is used. The second term represents the cost of extraction, or pumping cost, during
the period. The function C(.), the unit cost of extraction, is assumed to be such that C ′(.) < 0,
C ′′(.) ≥ 0. Unit costs increase when the level of the water table is low, and vice versa. Note
that extraction is realized at time t and the cost charged is considered at time t+ θ, θ ∈ [0, 1],
somewhere in the interval [t, t+1]. This allows to take into account interaction while extraction
is done. Setting θ = 0 means that when evaluating the cost, the water level is considered before
extraction (optimistic valuation). The opposite case θ = 1 is the worse case where the cost is
evaluated after extraction, when the water table is the lowest.
Finally, the third term γiHt+1 is the extra subjective benefit of maintaining the resource.
As mentioned previously, ρ is the discount factor, and γi his resource preference, that is
is a “subjective marginal benefit” of having one more unit of resource at the next period.
Comparing with (2.13), this amounts to choosing as scrap value S(H) = γiH.
3.2 A linear-quadratic example
In order to investigate further, analytically and numerically, the different behaviors introduced
in Section 2, we consider specific functional forms. Choosing the linear-quadratic setting will
allow the derivation of explicit formulas. Accordingly, we assume:




2, C(H) = c0 − c1H,
which results in the perceived profit function: from (3.2),




2 − wi (c0 − c1H − θc1(R− α(wi + wj)))
+ γiρ(H +R− α(wi + wj)). (3.3)
The parameters ai, c0 and γi have unit e/m3, parameters bi and c1 are in e/m6, α, ρ, θ are
dimensionless, and quantities R, H and w are measured in m3.
In the following sections, we develop the calculations for the dynamic schemes defined
in Section 2, in the particular case of the functional forms just introduced. We begin with
the two Nearsighted schemes (Section 3.2.1), then continue with three Conjectural Learning
procedures (Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4). In each case, we discuss the steady-state of the
system and its local convergence. For Conjectural Learning procedures, we check that they are
well-defined and regular (they are consistent, as mentioned in Section 2) and that the results
linking their steady states to those of the Nearsighted schemes (Proposition 7 and Proposition
12) are applicable.
3.2.1 Nearsighted behaviors
We start with writing the solution for the nearsighted behaviors of Section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.






3α2θ2c21 + 2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
(ai − c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − αγiρ) (3.4)
+
αθc1(ai − aj − αρ(γi − γj))
3α2θ2c21 + 2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
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Then, solving the steady-state stock conservation equation R = α(wi + wj), the limit stock
and steady-state controls are found to be:
c1H
N∞ = c0 +
(b1 + αθc1)(b2 + αθc1)
b1 + b2 + 2αθc1
R
α
− (a1 − αργ1)(b2 + αθc1) + (a2 − αργ2)(b1 + αθc1)




b1 + b2 + 2αθc1
(
ai − aj +
R
α
(bj + αθc1)− αρ(γi − γj)
)
. (3.6)




(a− c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − αργ) . (3.7)
















2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
(ai − c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − 2αγiρ)
+
2αθc1(ai − aj) + αρbj(γi − γj)
2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
. (3.9)
Then, solving the steady-state stock conservation equation, the limit stock and the steady



























(a− c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − 2αργ) . (3.12)











Convergence. Sufficient conditions for convergence are obtained by applying Proposition 6.
The partial derivatives of G are here: ∂G/∂wi = −α for i = 1, 2, ∂G/∂H = 1. Condition
(2.23) writes then in general as:∣∣∣∣1− α(∂soli∂H (H∞) + ∂solj∂H (H∞)
)∣∣∣∣ < 1,
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In addition, reaction functions in (3.4) and (3.9) are linear in the state, so that ∂soli/∂H is
actually a constant. We obtain, for the nearsighted Nash solution, the condition:
0 <
αc1(b1 + b2 + 2αθc1)
3α2θ2c21 + 2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
< 2,
or equivalently:
0 < 2θ(3θ − 1)α2c21 + (4θ − 1)(b1 + b2)αc1 + b1b2. (3.14)
The complete discussion appears to be quite involved, so we focus on the symmetric case: in
this case, after factoring out b+ αθc1, the condition reduces to:
0 < (3θ − 1)αc1 + b. (3.15)




2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
< 2









In the symmetric case, Condition (3.16) reduces to θ > (1− b/(αc1))/4. Solving (3.15) yields
the condition that θ > (1− b/(αc1))/3. In summary:
Proposition 14. In the symmetric case, the nearsighted Nash procedure converges locally
if θ > (1 − b/(αc1))/3 and the nearsighted cooperative procedure converges locally if θ >
(1− b/(αc1))/4.
3.2.2 Affine conjecture on w

















Ht +R− α(wti + w̄j + βti(wti − w̄i))
] ]
.
The function to be maximized is quadratic with leading term −bi/2− (c1αθ)(1 + βti). Solving







bi + 2c1αθ(1 + βti)
(
c1H
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The Conjectural Learning procedure build with the conjecture (2.24) is therefore well-defined
if bi/2 + (c1αθ)(1 + βti) > 0 at each step t. The solution is interior if w
t∗
i given by (3.17) is
nonnegative at each step t.
In the analysis of the steady state and convergence of this dynamic system, we will limit




b+ 2c1αθ(1 + β∞i )
(c1H
∞ + c1θ(R− αw̄(1− β∞i ))− ργα(1 + β∞i ) + a− c0) , i = 1, 2
(3.18)




i − w̄), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j (3.19)
R
α
= w∞i + w
∞
j . (3.20)
The complete solution of this system of equations is provided in Appendix B.1.1. The solution
reveals that, depending on conditions on the parameters, one or three solutions may exist:
one symmetric and two non-symmetric solutions, but symmetric of each other.
The symmetric solution is:






2α(c0 − a) +R(b+ 2c1αθ) + 4α2ργ
2c1α
= HP∞. (3.21)
It turns out not to depend on w̄.
Remark 6. The equality H∞ = HP∞ is a consequence of Proposition 7. We check now that
this proposition is applicable here. Indeed, note that from (3.2), we have:
∂Fi
∂wj
(wi, wj , H) = wiαC
′(H + θR− θα(wi + wj))− ργiα.







for all w and H. This means that the functions Fi and Fj satisfy (2.26).3 In the symmetric
solution, β∞i = β
∞




j . Therefore, if the CLP converges to this interior
solution, the stock converges to HP∞, the steady state of the cooperative nearsighted scheme.
Convergence. For the convergence of the process to this symmetric solution, results can be
obtained by applying Proposition 8 or even Proposition 9. We check the assumptions needed
to apply the first one. The critical quantity is ω = (∂r/∂β)(1, H∞)(w∞ − w̄)−1. From the
value of r(β,H) in (3.17), we have:
∂r
∂β
(1, H∞) = − Rc1θ + ργα
b+ 4c1αθ





3This property holds for a general pumping cost function C(·), even if the production parameters ai and bi
are not symmetric.
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Assume first that w̄ < w∞ = R/(2α). Then ω < 0 and Condition (2.28) is naturally satisfied




− w̄)− 4αθc1w̄ . (3.22)
If on the other hand w̄ > R/(2α), then ω > 0. Condition (2.29) is automatically satisfied,
and Condition (2.28) is satisfied for all µi < 1 whenever 1 + 2ω < 2. This sufficient condition
is in turn equivalent to ω < 1/2 and successively:







2αργ < b(w̄ − R
2α
) + 4θc1(αw̄ −R). (3.23)
We also have to check the condition (2.27). With the current form of G, this is:∣∣∣∣1− 2α ∂r∂H (1, H∞)
∣∣∣∣ < 1 ⇐⇒ ∣∣∣∣1− 2αc11 + 4c1αθ
∣∣∣∣ < 1
which is the condition encountered in (3.16). We have proved the following result: sufficient
conditions for convergence that are independent of the values of µi.
Proposition 15. When players are symmetric, the Conjectural Learning procedure with con-
jecture in (2.24) converges locally to the symmetric solution (3.21) under the following condi-
tions: a) θ > (1− (b/αc1))/4; b) either w̄ < R/(2α) and (3.22) or w̄ > R/(2α) and (3.23).
For the completely symmetric case, Proposition 9 states that Condition (2.27) is sufficient.
We then have the simpler result:
Lemma 4. When players are symmetric with in addition w̄i = w̄j and β0i = β
0
j , the Conjec-
tural Learning procedure with conjecture in (2.24) converges locally if θ > (1− (b/αc1))/4.
A final note on the non-symmetric solutions of fixed-point equations (3.18)–(3.20): these
solutions are repelling for all values of learning speeds µi, at least for some configurations of
parameters. See Appendix B.1.2.
3.2.3 Conjecture “imitate w”
















Ht +R− α(2wti + βti)
] ]
.
It is quadratic in wti with leading coefficient −bi/2− 2αc1 < 0. It is therefore strictly concave









ai − c0 + c1Ht +Rc1θ − αθc1βti − 2αργi
)
. (3.24)
This is clearly a continuous function, so that the Conjectural Learning procedure is regular.
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In fact, it turns out that the recurrence generated by the Conjectural Learning procedure
is linear. Indeed, the equations are:
w∗t1 =
1
4α c1 θ + b1
(




4α c1 θ + b2
(
a2 − c0 +Rc1 θ − 2αργ2 + c1Ht − αc1θβt2
)












Ht+1 = Ht +R− α(w∗t1 + w∗t2 ) .
Thus, the recurrence can be written as:βt+11βt+12
Ht+1
 =
1− µ1 + µ1αθc1φ1 −µ1αθc1φ2 µ1c1(φ2 − φ1)−µ2αθc1φ1 1− µ2 + µ2αθc1φ2 µ2c1(φ1 − φ2)
α2c1θφ1 α





 µ1 (φ2A2 − φ1A1)µ2 (φ1A1 − φ2A2)






, and Ai := ai − c0 +Rc1 θ − 2αργi, i = 1, 2.
Consequently, the steady-state equations turn out to be linear and admit a unique solution:
β∞1 = −β∞2 =
1

















∞ = c0 + c1θR+ (b1 + b2)
R
4α
− a1 + a2
2




Remark 7. Equation (3.28) highlights the effects of asymmetry on the steady-state value
of the stock. When players are symmetric, this steady-state stock coincides with the value
HP∞ given by (3.13) and w∞i = R/2α. This was predicted by Proposition 5, since, because
of symmetry, ∂Fi/∂wj = ∂Fj/∂wi and since the conjecture structurally satisfies ∂χi/∂wi = 1.
Moreover, in the non-symmetric case, it is sufficient that b1 = b2 to have HP∞ = H∞. This
condition does not imply that wP∞i = w
∞
i , though.
Convergence. We now apply Proposition 11 to obtain conditions for convergence. Since
the recurrence is linear, local convergence conditions are actually global.
Proposition 16. Consider the Conjectural Learning procedure defined above in the symmetric
case. If θ > (1− b/(αc1))/4, then the procedure converges.
Proof. This Conjectural Learning procedure is a linear recurrence of the formXt+1 = JXt+K,
where the matrix J coincides with the Jacobian matrix as defined in (A.9). The recurrence
converges (globally) if Condition (2.27) and Conditions (2.32)–(2.33) of Proposition 11 are
satisfied. Condition (2.27) is equivalent to (3.16), as it was in the proof of Proposition 8.
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For the two remaining conditions, the critical value is ω = (∂ri)/(∂β)(β∞, H∞) = −αθc1
/(b + 4αθc1). Since this is negative, Condition (2.32) is automatically satisfied. It is readily
seen that ω ∈ (−1/4, 0), so that Condition (2.33) is satisfied as well. This concludes the
proof.
3.2.4 Affine conjecture on H
We now turn to conjectures that are a function of H alone. We adopt the following form:
wAHj = βi(Ht +R), i 6= j.
This is an instance of the general form (2.34), with H̄i = −R, w̄i = 0, i = 1, 2. In this form,
the the conjecture of Player i is that her opponent will consume some proportion of the stock
available taking into account the recharge R.
























This problem is quadratic and strictly concave since bi/2 + αθci > 0. Its solution is then
unique and the Conjectural Learning procedure based on it is well-defined. In the interior





ai − c0 + c1(Ht + θR− αβtiθ(Ht +R))− ραγi
bi + 2c1αθ
. (3.29)
This is a continuous (actually, linear) function βi and H. Therefore, the Conjectural Learning
procedure is regular.











ai − c0 + c1(H∞ + θR− αβiθ(H∞ +R))− ραγi
bi + 2c1αθ
, i = 1, 2.
Solving these, we find as unique steady state:
wAH∞i =
1
b1 + b2 + 2αθc1
(






AH∞ = c0 +
(b1 + αθc1)(b2 + αθc1)
b1 + b2 + 2αθc1
R
α
− (a1 − αργ1)(b2 + αθc1) + (a2 − αργ2)(b1 + αθc1)





Remark 8. These limits coincide with the quantities in (3.6) and (3.5). This is in accordance
with Proposition 3 and Proposition 12: when it converges, this CLP does to the nearsighted
Nash steady state. No symmetry condition is required.
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Remark 9. Note that with this conjecture we do not have the property β∞i β
∞
j = 1, as in the







Convergence. In order to state sufficient conditions for the convergence of the current con-
jectural learning scheme, we apply Proposition 13. We restrict the discussion to the symmetric
case. The convergence result can then be stated as:
Proposition 17. Consider the Conjectural Learning procedure defined above in the symmetric
case. Let (βAH∞i , w
AH∞
i , H
AH∞) be its unique steady state, and assume HAH∞ > 0. Then if
both θ ≥ (3− 2b/(αc1))/4 and θ ≤ b/(αc1), the procedure converges locally.
The proof of this result is in Appendix B.2.
3.2.5 Farsighted solutions
The solutions for farsighted Nash and farsighted cooperative (Pareto) solutions can be obtained
using either the maximum principle, or fixed-point formulas based on the fact that the value
function is quadratic (see e.g. [1, Section 6.2.3]).
The solution yields the following values for the steady-state stock and the state-feedback
control law (the label “FP” stands for farsighted Pareto):
HFP∞ =
































For the Nash-feedback solution, no such explicit formulas seem to exist. In the experiments
of Section 4, we used a numerical solution.
3.2.6 Summary and comparisons
In this section, we compile results obtained for six dynamic procedures analyzed thus far:
two nearsighted, three Conjectural Learning and the cooperative farsighted. We leave out the
Nash farsighted procedure for lack of explicit enough formulas.
In the general (non-symmetric) case, from Proposition 3 we know that the steady state of
the Conjectural Learning procedure affine in H coincides with that of the nearsighted Nash
scheme. In the symmetric case, Proposition 5 implies that the steady state of Conjectural
Learning procedures depending on w coincide with that of the nearsighted Pareto scheme.
Finally, the comparison reduces to the three complete information schemes.
From the comparison of the different formulas, we sketch a parametric discussion about
feedback laws, asymptotic consumption and stocks. Comparison of profits will be the topic of
the experiments in Section 4.
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Comparisons of feedback laws. The feedback laws and best-reply functions are as follows.




3α2θ2c21 + 2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
(ai − c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − αγiρ) (3.4)
+
αθc1(ai − aj − αρ(γi − γj))
3α2θ2c21 + 2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
solPi (H) =
bj (ai − c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − αρ(γ1 + γ2)) + 2αθc1(ai − aj)
2αθc1(b1 + b2) + b1b2
(3.9)
rawi (βi, H) =
1
bi + 2αc1θ(1 + βi)
(ai − c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − αc1θ(w̄j − βiw̄i))− ραγi(1 + βi))
(3.17)
riwi (βi, H) =
1
bi + 4αc1θ
(ai − c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − αc1θβi − 2αργi) (3.24)
raHi (βi, H) =
1
bi + 2αc1θ
(ai − c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − αc1βiθ(H +R))− ραγi) . (3.29)
The feedback law for the farsighted cooperative solution does not appear here for simplicity.








(a− c0 + c1H +Rc1θ − 2αργ) . (3.12)
Comparing these functions, we see that the sensitivity to the stock (slope) is larger for the
Nash solution, and that the intercept (when H = 0) is larger as well. This is consistent in
the sense that the Nash behavior is expected to be more aggressive on the resource than the
Pareto behavior.
Also, comparing function riwi (·) in (3.24) (in the symmetric case) and function solPi (·)
in (3.12), we observe a large similarity, the only difference being the term −αθc1βi in the
numerator of (3.24). In this symmetric case, the steady-state of the CPL “imitate w” is
βi = 0 (see (3.26)). So, as convergence occurs, βti tends to 0 and the reactions coincide for
both schemes. This explains the similarity in the simulation results which we will observe in
Section 4.
Comparisons in w∞. The steady-state consumption levels are obtained for nearsighted
and farsighted schemes, in the general (non-symmetric) case, in (3.6), (3.11) and (3.31):
wN∞i =
1
b1 + b2 + 2αθc1
(
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We observe in (3.11) and (3.31) that the extraction at the steady is the same for both
cooperative situations: nearsighted and farsighted. This is somewhat surprising, since the
first one depends on the subjective parameter γ, whereas the second one does not. The
parameters γi do appear in wN∞i .





(b1 + αθc1)(b2 + αθc1)
c1(b1 + b2 + 2αθc1)
R
α
− (a1 − αργ1)(b2 + αθc1) + (a2 − αργ2)(b1 + αθc1)


























Observe that the stock HP∞ depends on the parameters γi only through their sum, and is
thus independent of the way this sum is distributed between farmers. This was also the case


































Pareto vs Nash. We start with comparing HN∞ and HP∞ in the general case. We can easily
see that
a1 = a2, or b1 = b2, or θ = 0 implies HP∞ > HN∞.
In a more general context we can prove that when ρ = 0, and provided that ai > c0,
R >
α[αθ(a1 + a2 − 2c0)c1 + b1(a2 − c0) + b2(a1 − c0)]
(αθc1 + b2)(αθc1 + b1)
implies HP∞ > HN∞ > 0.




From these two facts, we conclude that HP∞ > HN∞ > 0 for all 0 ≤ ρ < 1.
Complete vs Incomplete Information. There exist values of the parameters γi such that the
steady-state stock of nearsighted and conjectural schemes coincides with that of the coopera-
tive solution. In the general case, from the comparison of (3.10) and (3.30) we see that when
γ1 + γ2 = Rc1/(α(1− ρ)), the steady-states H∞ are the same.
In the symmetric case, we find:




= 0 ⇐⇒ ρ = 0 or γP = Rc1
2α(1− ρ)
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In order to obtain the same steady state in the state variable, the valuation of the scrap value
must be greater in the case of conjectures in H than in the case of conjectures in w. This is
again expected since the Nash behavior is more aggressive on the resource, and for each γ,
HN (γ) < HP (γ).
4 Numerical experiments
In complement to the theoretical analysis of Section 3.2, this section reports numerical sim-
ulations of the seven dynamic schemes introduced in Section 2. The purpose is to compare
the “performance” of agents using these schemes. The criteria we use for this are discussed
in Section 4.1. In addition to the model parameters, each agent behavior has its own set of
parameters. This opens a multitude of possibilities for simulations. Consistently with our
theoretical analysis, we choose to focus on intrinsic properties of the behaviors. Namely, we
restrict our attention to strategic interactions in which agents engage in the same type of be-
havior. Moreover, we consider mostly symmetric agents. The study of asymmetric situations
where agents of different types confront each other is beyond the scope of this paper.
In the rest of this section, we first present our point of view on how to evaluate the
different situations (Section 4.1). We briefly discuss interior solutions and valid trajectories
(Section 4.2). Then we present the parameters used in the simulations (Section 4.3) and the
results of the simulations (Section 4.4).
4.1 Evaluation
The “performance” of a learning scheme can be assessed using many criteria. Taking into ac-
count environmental and economic concerns, we select for our comparisons: a) the limit/steady
state stock of water H∞, representing the environment, and b) the total discounted sum of
profits for both players, representing the welfare of the society.4 Accordingly, we perform
simulations for a certain number T of time steps, and we record: a) the values of HT as a












The parameter T is chosen in a way that convergence of the dynamical systems and the
measured quantities is observed. So, for practical purposes, HT ' H∞ and V T ' V∞, where
V∞ is the joint profit optimized in (2.40).
The graphs reported below represent the result of a given simulation in the plane (H∞,
V∞). We do not claim that one scheme is better than another: in the spirit of multi-criteria
evaluation, we associate to each situation a vector of values, and leave it to some decision
maker to determine its best compromise or take into account other aspects of the problem.
4In the symmetric situations, the graphs will display the welfare of each player, that is, V∞/2.
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For some situations, simulation is actually not necessary since theory provides the metrics
we need. This is the case for H∞, which is predicted in each situation, see Section 3.2.6. This
is also the case when the behavior of agents is a linear feedback of the state: this happens
for complete information behaviors, nearsighted and farsighted. In that case, the formulas of
Appendix B.3 allow to calculate the total gain. In all situations where an explicit formula is
available, we have used it for double checking the simulation.
4.2 Valid trajectories
The analysis of Section 3.2 has largely ignored the constraints on controls and states of the
physical problem: it has assumed interior solutions for maximization problems, and there is no
statement about the feasibility of (candidate) optimal trajectories, except near steady states.
In the experiments of this section, the trajectories are checked for the following properties:
• Ht ≥ 0 and (1− θ)Ht + θHt+1 ≤ c0/c1 for all t, implying C((1− θ)Ht + θHt+1) ≥ 0 for
all t;
• wt ≥ 0 for all t.
The diagrams will not present results corresponding to trajectories that are not valid.
4.3 Parameters and experimental plan
The parameters chosen for the experiments are summarized in Table 1.
Parameter interpretation value
R recharge 1
α pumping return flow coefficient 1
a marginal productivity of water 1
b productivity saturation coefficient 0.04
c0 baseline unit pumping cost 1
c1 pumping cost increase per water table unit 0.01
H0 initial water table level 30
θ weight of future stock 1/2
ρ discount factor 0.8 and 0.95
γ subjective unit value of future stock 0 to 2
µi learning rate 0.1 to 0.9
T simulation time horizon 100
Table 1: Parameters of the experiments
Note that the form chosen for the unit pumping cost, namely c0 − c1H, implies that the
water table is assumed to have maximum height Hmax = c0/c1. With the parameters of
Table 1, Hmax = 100, which corresponds to 100 years of recharge since R = 1. The weight
parameter θ = 1/2 models a pumping uniformly distributed over the time period.
The learning procedures have proper parameters: the learning rates µi ∈ (0, 1] and the
scheme-specific parameter, βi, at the beginning of the process. We generally choose the initial
value β0i to be: a) relatively far from the steady state, and b) meaningful with respect to
the learning procedure. For the CLP affine in w, the steady state is 1, and we pick β0i = 0.
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This conjecture corresponds to an agent believing the other one will not react to her choices.
For the CLP “imitate w”, the steady state is 0, and we pick β0i = 2, a reasonable shift in
consumption, given the initial value of the stock. Finally, for the CLP affine in H, the steady
state is of the order of 1/H∞, therefore quite close to 0. So we pick β0i = 1/2, meaning that
the agent expects that the other one will consume half of the stock.
Convergence. The parameters of Table 1 satisfy the convergence conditions of Proposition 14,
15, 16 and 17. These results state only a local convergence (except for Proposition 16) but
convergence has been observed from the initial values β0i in all situations. Some trajectories
were not valid however, as discussed in Section 4.2.
Experiments. In our experiments, we test the sensitivity of the “performance” vector (H,V )
with respect to µi (learning speed parameter), and γ. The parameter γ is relevant to near-
sighted schemes and conjectural learning procedures. When γ varies, the vector (H(γ), V (γ))
draws a parametric curve in the diagrams. On the other hand, the farsighted schemes do not
depend on γ, and will serve as comparison benchmarks.
The theoretical analysis of Section 3.2 provides insights allowing to anticipate some results.
First of all, the value H∞ turns out to be linear and increasing as a function of γ: see formulas
(3.8) and (3.13) in Section 3.2.6. However, the linearity coefficient is not the same: ρα/c1 for
the nearsighted Nash scheme and the conjectural learning procedures with conjectures in H,
and 2ρα/c1 for the nearsighted Pareto scheme and the conjectural learning procedures with
conjectures in w. This means that a same value of H∞ will be obtained for: either the same
values of γ, or different values, depending on the scheme adopted.
Second, as mentioned in Section 4.1, the behavior of nearsighted agents is an affine state
feedback of the form ν0 +ν1H. Checking again Section 3.2.6, we see that the value of ν0 is also
affine in γ. The value V ν0,ν1 is quadratic and concave in ν0: this can be deduced from (B.18)
in Appendix B.3. Consequently, V (γ) is quadratic and concave as a function of H∞(γ).
As it appears, this concave dependency is a general feature of all dynamic schemes. In
the simulations reported below, we display the parametric curve (H∞(γ), V (γ)) in different
situations.
4.4 Results




CLP-AH conjectural learning procedure, affine in H
CLP-Aw conjectural learning procedure, affine in w
CLP-Iw conjectural learning procedure, imitate w
4.4.1 Complete information behaviors
We compare in this section the performance realized by agents adopting one of the behaviors
requiring complete knowledge of the opponent’s utility: the nearsighted and farsighted proce-
dures. The nearsighted procedures depend on the parameter γ which weights the importance
of the remaining stock. Accordingly, Figure 1 represents the total discounted economic profit
V∞ and H∞ as a function of γ.
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Arrows are used to show how H∞ depends on γ. The larger γ is, the larger the difference,

























Figure 1: (H∞(γ), V (γ)) for complete information schemes
It is observed that when γ = 0 (the agent does not care about the future at all), the per-
formance is worse than the Nash-feedback farsighted performance, in both the economic and
the environmental metrics. However, for certain values of γ, the performance of nearsighted
agents can get very close to the cooperative farsighted performance. The values of γ for which
the largest value of V (γ) is observed are γP ' 0.112 and γN ' 0.229 for the Pareto and Nash
nearsighted schemes, respectively. The respective values are V P ' 3.0203 with HP∞ ' 23.775
and V N = 3.0173 with HN∞ ' 23.996, to be compared with the farsighted cooperative value
V FP ' 3.0346 and HFP∞ = 21.5.
For larger values of γ, corresponding to larger values of H∞(γ), trajectories cease to be
valid. In those cases, H0 < H∞(γ) and we observe with the chosen parameters that the
optimal feedback prescribes a negative extraction.
4.4.2 Incomplete information behaviors
We now compare the performance of learning agents. These Conjectural Learning procedures
have their own parameters in addition to the parameters of the utility functions, namely,
learning parameters µi and initial values of the learning functions, commonly referred to as:
β0i , i = 1, 2. We only examine the sensitivity of the performance of agents with respect to
parameters µi. Figures 2, 3 and 4 display the total discounted economic profit and H∞ as a
function of γ and for different values of µi. The three CLPs of Section 2.3 are successively
represented: CLP affine in w (Sections 2.3.1 and 3.2.2), “imitate w” (Sections 2.3.2 and 3.2.3)
and affine in H (Sections 2.3.3 and 3.2.4).
For the CLP affine in w, it is observed that smaller values of µ (hence a slow learning)
can yield both high values of the profit and the stock, for certain values of γ. In that case,
the trajectories of stocks and controls remain valid. The performance is not very sensitive to
larger values of µ, but the larger values of γ result in invalid trajectories.
For the CLP “imitate w”, there is almost no sensitivity to the value of µ. This is explained
by the relatively small weight of the term αc1θβi in front of c1H in the best-reply function
riwi , see (3.24).
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Figure 4: (H∞(γ), V (γ)). Learning affine in H.
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Finally, the the CLP affine in H has the feature that smaller learning rates result in larger
total profits, for almost all values of the parameter γ. The sensitivity to µ however tends to
vanish where the profit is the largest.
In the following Figure 5, we superimpose the different learning behaviors for selected
values of µ. We conclude that, for a given value of the asymptotic environmental metric H∞,
both the CLP affine in H and the CLP “imitate w” yield a higher economic performance
than the CLP affine in w. As observed above, the performance of the first scheme does not
depend much on µ, so we selected the value µ = 0.9 for it. We selected µ = 0.1 which yields
the best maximum for the CLP affine in H. The maximum value of the gain V is realized
at γaw = 0.125 with V aw ' 2.8050 and H∞ = 26.25, γaH = 0.2 with V aH ' 3.0019 and



















Incomplete information behavior, ρ=0.95
CLP-AH, µ = 0.1
CLP-Aw, µ = 0.1
CLP-Aw, µ = 0.5
CLP-Aw, µ = 0.9
CLP-Iw, µ = 0.9
Figure 5: (H∞(γ), V (γ)). Comparison of Conjectural Learning procedures
4.4.3 Comparison of all schemes
Next, we compare the performance realized by all schemes discussed previously: farsighted,
nearsighted and Conjectural Learning schemes. This appears in Figure 6. The insert is a
close-up around the top of the curves.
From this figure, it is concluded that globally, nearsighted schemes, the CLP affine in H
and the CLP “imitate w” have about the same maximal performance with respect to the metric
V . In the detail around the maximal performance, nearsighted schemes perform slightly better
than the CLP affine in H, itself slightly superior to the CLP “imitate w”. The value of the
limit stock is however larger for the latter scheme.
We now give a look at the trajectories generated by the different schemes. We select for µ
and γ the parameters that yields (approximately) the maximum total discounted profit V (γ)
in the previous experiments. For the CLPs affine in w and “imitate w”, the value taken is
γ = 0.125 (see Figure 2). For the CLP affine in H, this value is γ = 0.2 (see Figure 4). The
comparison is done with the trajectories resulting from farsighted behaviors. The different
trajectories are displayed in Figure 7. The insert shows a zoom of the first time units.
The trajectories obtained for the farsighted Nash behavior and for the Pareto optimum
are strikingly different. The farsighted Nash trajectory exhibits a large consumption of the
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Near- and far-sighted behavior, ρ=0.95
FS Nash
FS Pareto
CLP-AH, µ = 0.1
NS Nash
CLP-Aw, µ = 0.1
CLP-Aw, µ = 0.9
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Figure 6: (H∞(γ), V (γ)). All behaviors, ρ = 0.95
resource and a sharp decrease of the stock, typical of the “tragedy of the commons”. The
farsighted Pareto trajectory is more interesting. It starts with a parsimonious consumption,
comparable with that of the nearsighted Pareto and “imitate w” schemes. However, it main-
tains a relatively high level of consumption longer than these schemes, and finally reaches a
lowest asymptotic resource.
The trajectory for the CLP affine in H is similar to the nearsighted Pareto one, in the
sense that it has almost the same asymptotic value. The consumption is however smaller in
the beginning but then increases so that both trajectories of the stock become superimposed.
The trajectory for the CLP affine in w is also different from the other ones. It starts with a
sharp decrease in the stock, which reduces it actually below its asymptotic value. The following
steps slowly recover the missing stock until convergence. This initial error in the conjecture is
certainly what causes this learning scheme to have a substantially worse performance in terms
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State trajectories for ρ=0.95
FS Nash
FS Pareto
NS Pareto, γ = 0.125
NS Nash, γ = 0.225
CLP-Iw, γ = 0.125
CLP-Aw, γ = 0.125
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Figure 7: Evolution of the resource for the γ which gives the maximum profit. ρ = 0.95.
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Near- and far-sighted behavior, ρ=0.8
FS Nash
FS Pareto
CLP-AH, µ = 0.1
CLP-AH, µ = 0.9
NS Nash
CLP-Aw, µ = 0.1
CLP-Aw, µ = 0.9
NS Pareto
CLP-Iw, µ = 0.9
Figure 8: (H∞(γ), V (γ)). All behaviors, ρ = 0.8
4.4.4 Sensitivity with respect to the discount rate
Finally, we briefly have a look at the influence of ρ on the performance. The discount factor
intervenes in the decision of shortsighted and learning agents as a coefficient affecting the
valuation of the future stock, see (3.3).
Figure 8 displays the results for ρ = 0.8. Compare to Figure 6 for ρ = 0.95.
With such a reduced discount rate, the positions of farsighted Nash and Pareto performance
points are much closer and have lower values of both asymptotic stock H∞ and value. This is
expected since agents are typically more aggressive when they discount more the future. The
performance of nearsighted schemes and conjectural learning procedures in terms of value,
can approach that of farsighted Pareto, but with a higher value of the asymptotic stock.
This feature already present for ρ = 0.95 is magnified with ρ = 0.8. It is even more salient
for smaller values of ρ (graphs not shown here). The values of γ that correspond to these
best performances are smaller than for ρ = 0.95: it is consistent that agents should pay less
attention to future stocks when the discount rate is smaller.
4.4.5 Asymmetric cases
We complete the experimental section with a brief investigation of the impact of asymmetry
on the gain of the players. Specifically, we consider two asymmetric situations.
In a first experiment, we set the parameters of both players to the same values with the
exception of a. We analyze the CLP “imitate w” which seems to achieve the best performance in
the symmetric case. We compare with the complete-information, nearsighted Pareto scheme,
and the farsighted Pareto as benchmark. As in the previous experiments, we let γ vary. We
report H∞(γ), V 1(γ), V 2(γ) and the sum V 1(γ) +V 2(γ). For a given value of γ, the value of
H∞(γ) is the same for the CLP and the nearsighted scheme. The result appears in Figure 9.
One striking feature of Figure 9 is the large asymmetry of gains for both players, given
that the asymmetry in parameters is relatively small: ∼ 1% for parameters ai. Player 1 with
a (slight) productivity advantage gets a large proportion of the total profit. The total gain
appears to be still comparable with the optimal one (Farsighted Pareto solution), at least for
a proper choice of the parameters γi.
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Case with asymmetric a, ρ=0.95
FS Pareto, Player 1
FS Pareto, Player 2
FS Pareto, Player 1+2
NS Pareto, Player 1
NS Pareto, Player 2




















Case with asymmetric γ, ρ=0.95
FS Pareto, Player 1
FS Pareto, Player 2
FS Pareto, Player 1+2
NS Pareto, Player 1
NS Pareto, Player 2




Figure 10: (H∞(γ), V (γ)). Asymmetric values of γ
In a second experiment, we set all parameters equal except γ. We assume that γ1 =
(11/9)γ2. As above, we report results as a function of γ = (γ1 +γ2)/2. The result is displayed
in Figure 10.
We still observe a large asymmetry of gains for both players having the CLP-Iw behavior,
although parameters γi have only an asymmetry of order ∼ 10%. Player 1 with a larger
concern for future stock gets a much smaller share of the total gain when her behavior is
the CLP-Iw. When the behavior is nearsighted Pareto, players obtain the same share: this
can be seen indeed from (3.9) and explained by the fact that the function to be optimized is
symmetric in (w1, w2) when only γi differ. The maximal total gain attainable still appears to
be comparable with the optimal one.
5 Discussion and extensions
We have formally defined and analyzed a group of behaviors for agents with limited rationality,
engaged in a dynamic game with two players and one state variable. A first class of behaviors,
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called ’nearsighted’, assumes that agents have a complete knowledge of the opponent’s profit
function, but have a limited care for the future in their optimization. In the second class,
agents do not have this information, and instead form conjectures on the behavior of their
opponent. They do however observe this behavior, and revise their conjectures accordingly.
We have determined the convergence properties of the dynamical systems generated by these
behaviors. In particular, we have proved that the limit state of nearsighted schemes coincides
with that of conjectural schemes under simple conditions on the nature of the conjecture.
We have applied these models of behavior to the problem of managing the extraction of
groundwater between two producers, and proposed to evaluate the “performance” of agents
in along the two dimensions of asymptotic stock of the resource, and total discounted profit.
Since nearsighted agents typically over-exploit the resource (both in situations of complete
and incomplete information), we have introduced in their utility function a valuation of the
future resource, associated to a parameter γ.
The numerical simulations we have provided indicate that the simple agent behaviors we
have introduced can perform almost as well as the optimal farsighted Pareto solution, in
terms of profit, for certain values of this parameter γ. This performance is even associated to
a larger asymptotic stock, which can be seen as an additional benefit. Among the incomplete-
information learning schemes, the one affine in the stock H and the one consisting in copying
the opponent’s consumption w seem to perform best. The performance of the third learning
scheme, the one affine in w, is hindered by potentially bad initial choices.
On the other hand, this parameter γ is subjective in nature, and real players have a priori
no reason or means to choose it close to its “optimal” value. This may be an opportunity for
developing public policies, either by suggesting some valuation γ or imposing it through taxes.
In this situation, determining which behavior is followed by agents is essential, since the value
of H∞ depends both on γ and on this behavior.
Future investigations should investigate more elaborate agent behavior, for instance in-
cluding elementary statistics on past observation. In the domain of conjectural learning pro-
cedures, conjectures with more than one parameter similarly pose the question of using several
observations to adjust the agent’s model of the opponent.
Finally, in the context of the application to resource management, it should be interesting
to mix agents with different behaviors and study the impact of beliefs and shortsightedness
on profits and the state of the resource.
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A Proofs of convergence results
We state in this appendix the technical theorems that support the convergence results of
Section 2. We start with general matrix stability results. Next, we specialize these results to
the different dynamical systems we have introduced.
A.1 Stability results
We propose in this section sufficient conditions for stability that will be used for the analysis
of the different dynamical systems constructed in the paper. Those are based on the Geršgorin
circle theorem (see e.g. [5, Section 6.1]) which we recall here for the sake of completeness:
Theorem 18 (Geršgorin). Consider a n×n matrix A with complex entries. The spectrum of
A lies in the union of the discs of centers Aii and radiuses
∑
j 6=i |Aij |, for i = 1, . . . , n.
In the analysis of stability of discrete-time dynamic systems, we are interested in locating
the spectrum of matrices inside the unit disk. We then have the following result as an obvious
consequence of Geršgorin’s theorem.
Theorem 19. Consider a real, n×n matrix A. The spectrum of A lies in the unit disc if the
following conditions are satisfied for all i:∑
j 6=i
|Aij | < min{1−Aii, 1 +Aii}. (A.1)
It turns out that the dynamic systems we consider have variables of different nature:
different units and different ranges. In that situation, the following modification of Theorem 19
is relevant. It results from the facts that: A and AΣ := Σ−1AΣ have the same spectrum,




Theorem 20. Consider a real, n × n matrix A. If there exist numbers σi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
such that for each i, ∑
j 6=i
|Aij |σj < σi min{1−Aii, 1 +Aii}, (A.2)
then the spectrum of A lies in the unit disc.




1− µ1 − µ1ω µ1ω
µ2ω 1− µ2 − µ2ω
)
, (A.3)
for some parameters µ1, µ2 > 0 and ω. The eigenvalues of M can be located as follows.
Lemma 5. A sufficient condition for the eigenvalues of M to lie strictly inside the unit circle
is:
1 + 2 min(ω, 0) > 0, and µi(1 + 2 max(ω, 0)) < 2, i = 1, 2. (A.4)
If µ1 = µ2 = µ, a necessary and sufficient condition for the eigenvalues of M to lie strictly
inside the unit circle is
µ < 2, 1 + 2ω > 0, and µ(1 + 2ω) < 2. (A.5)
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Proof. Applying Theorem 19, a sufficient condition for the spectrum of M to lie in the unit
disc is:
µi|ω| < 1− (1− µi − µiω) ⇐⇒ µi(1 + ω − |ω|) > 0
µi|ω| < 1 + (1− µi − µiω) ⇐⇒ µi(1 + ω + |ω|) < 2.
Given that ω + |ω| = 2 max(ω, 0) and ω − |ω| = 2 min(ω, 0), and µi > 0, these conditions
rewrite as (A.4).
When µ1 = µ2 = µ, the eigenvalues of M are exactly 1 − µ and 1 − µ − 2µω. Requiring
that these lie in the interval (−1, 1) is equivalent to (A.5).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 8
Consider for the moment a general (not necessarily symmetric) Conjectural Learning procedure























































The partial derivatives of G are evaluated at (w∞1 , w∞2 , H∞).
With the assumption on symmetry, both players have the same reaction function: r1(β,H)
= r2(β,H). Since it is also assumed that β∞1 = β∞2 = 1, then r11 = r22 and rjH = β∞i riH ,












































and those of the submatrix:
J ′S =
(
1− µ1 − µ1ω µ1ω






Local stability occurs when all three eigenvalues have a modulus strictly less than 1. Under
the Condition (2.27), this is the case for λ3. The application of Lemma 5 allows to conclude
that Conditions (2.28) and (2.29) imply this for the eigenvalues of J ′S .
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 11























The Jacobian matrix at the fixed point then writes as:
J =

1− µ1 − µ1r11 µ1r22 µ1(r2H − r1H)
















The partial derivatives of G are evaluated at w∞1 and w∞2 .
With the assumption on symmetry, both players have the same reaction function: r1(β,H)
= r2(β,H).5 Then r11 = r22 = rβ and r1H = r2H = rH . After making substitutions in (A.6),
the Jacobian matrix becomes:
JS =

1− µ1 − µ1rβ µ1rβ 0






























and those of the submatrix:
J ′S =
(
1− µ1 − µ1r11 µ1r11
µ2r11 1− µ2 − µ2r11
)
.
This is the same situation as in Section A.2, with a different expression for ω. The application
of Lemma 5 allows to conclude that Conditions (2.32) and (2.33) imply that the eigenvalues
of J ′S lie in the unit circle, hence local stability.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 13























5Here, it is not assumed that β∞1 = β∞2 .
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The partial derivatives of G are evaluated at (w∞1 , w∞2 , H∞).
With the assumption on symmetry, both players have the same reaction function: r1(β,H)
= r2(β,H). Then r11 = r22 = rβ and r1H = r2H = rH . Also, H̄1 = H̄2 = H̄. We then apply
Theorem 20 with σ1 = σ2 = 1 and σ3 = λ|H∞− H̄|, for some λ > 0. We obtain the sufficient
conditions:
for i = 1, 2,
µi|rβ|
|H∞ − H̄|




































> −λ|H∞ − H̄|.
With the notation of the proposition, and since 0 < µi ≤ 1, the first one is equivalent to:
|ω1|+ λ|ω2 − β∞| < 1,
































which are (2.36) and (2.37).
B Analysis of the example
In this section, we expose some of the calculations related to the example specified in Sec-
tion 3.2.
B.1 Affine conjecture on w
This part is devoted to the analysis of the dynamical system generated by the CLP affine in
w, in the symmetric case (which includes w̄i = w̄j). It will be convenient to perform first a
change of variables and rename some parameters.
Consider first the change of variables: W ti = w
t
i − w̄, i = 1, 2, t = 0, . . . ,∞. Define then
A := θR+








B := −θαw̄ − ργα
c1
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Ht+1 = Ht + αZ − α(W t1 +W t2) . (B.3)
B.1.1 Limit points for the affine conjecture on w
We are looking points (β1, β2,W1,W2, H) which are possible limits of the recurrence (B.1)–
(B.3). According to Lemma 1, we have βiβj = 1, and also:
W1 = β2 W2 (B.4)
W2 = β1 W1, (B.5)









W1 +W2 = Z. (B.8)
We proceed with solving the system (B.6)–(B.5). It is assumed that C 6= D, which is equivalent
to b 6= 0.
We first eliminate W2 = β1W1. Next, eliminating the term H + A from (B.6) and (B.7),
we obtain:
(C +Dβ1)W1 −Bβ1 = (C +Dβ2)W2 −Bβ2 = (C +Dβ2)β1W1 −Bβ2
W1(1− β1)(C −D) = B(β1 − β2). (B.9)
One first case in the discussion is when B = 0. In that case, since C 6= D by assumption,
either β1 = 1 or W1 = 0. Assume β1 = 1: then we find as solution:






(C +D)− (A+B) . (B.10)
Assume now that B = 0 and W1 = 0. Then W2 = 0 and necessarily Z = 0. If this is not the
case, there is no solution with W1 = 0. If this is the case, H = −A and the solution is as in
(B.10) except that β1 and β2 are not determined by the equations.
Assuming now B 6= 0, we use β2 = 1/β1 and in (B.9), to get:
β1W1(1− β1)(C −D) = B(β21 − 1).
Again, we find that β1 = 1 solves this equation, which gives the solution (B.10). Assuming
that β1 6= 1, we are left with the system of two equations:
β1W1(C −D) = −B(1 + β1)
Inria
Nearsighted, farsighted behaviors and learning 43
W1(1 + β1) = Z,
which implies:
β1(1 + β1)W1(C −D) +B(1 + β1)2 = 0
β1Z(C −D) +B(1 + β1)2 = 0
Bβ21 + (2B + Z(C −D))β1 +B = 0. (B.11)
The two roots of the polynomial in (B.11) have their product equal to 1. We pick any of them
as β1, the other one will be β2. Explicitly, they are:
β1 = − 1 +











∆ := Z(D − C)(Z(D − C)− 4B). (B.13)















H = CZ +B −A . (B.14)
A second solution is deduced by symmetry, exchanging the role of β1 and β2. It is checked
that these solutions, when placed in the dynamics (B.1)–(B.3), result in a fixed point.
We conclude with checking whether these solutions are real or complex for the parameters
of the harvesting model. Given the values of B,C,D and Z, we have
D − C = − b
c1
< 0







− 4α (θw̄ − ργ) .
Depending on the value of w̄, Z may be of either sign. It seems that ∆ can be of either sign
as well.
B.1.2 Stability of fixed points
Starting from Equation (A.6) of Appendix B.1.1, it can be shown that the Jacobian of the
dynamics (B.2)–(B.3) (where W ti , i = 1, 2, has been eliminated with (B.1)) can be written





























where we have used the shorthand notation:
ψi := C +Dβi, σ := D(H +A)−BC.
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The eigenvalues of J are 1 plus those of J̄ . When the fixed point is given by (B.10), the
analysis of these eigenvalues is done in Section 3.2.2. When it is given by (B.12)–(B.14), the
eigenvalues of J̄ are less easy to locate, but it can be proved that one of them is real and
positive, at least if Z > 0 (that is, w̄ < R/(2α)) and D > 0 (that is, θ > 0). Indeed, the
determinant of J̄ turns out to be:
|J̄ | = µ1µ2α∆
Zσ(C −D)
,
where ∆ is defined in (B.13). If the solution (B.12) exists, ∆ ≥ 0. Also, because of (B.14),
σ = D(H + A) − BC = D(CZ + B) − BC = DCZ − B(C − D) ≥ 0 because C > D > 0,
B ≤ 0 and Z > 0. We conclude that |J̄ | ≥ 0.
On the other hand, the eigenvalues λ of J̄ are solution of the polynomial χ(λ) = |J̄ − λI|.
This is a polynomial of degree 3 with leading coefficient −1, such that χ(0) = |J̄ | ≥ 0.
Therefore, it has a root in the interval [0,+∞). As a consequence, the Jacobian J has an
eigenvalue larger than 1, and the fixed point (B.12)–(B.14) is not attractive if ∆ = 0, and
repelling if ∆ > 0.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 17





Applying Proposition 13, the sufficient condition for convergence to a steady state (β∞, β∞,




















Note that ω1 ≤ 0. Given the specification of function G, the conditions of Proposition 13 are:









We first express these conditions as constraints on β∞, then convert those to constraints on
θ. From the first condition,




∣∣∣∣1− αθβ∞ψ + αθ − β∞
∣∣∣∣ < 1
αθ + λ |1− (ψ + 2αθ)β∞| < ψ + αθ
|1− (ψ + 2αθ)β∞| < ψ
λ
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−ψ
λ

















Next, we consider the two other conditions:
2α
λ
















































− ψ + αθ
α2θ
}

















As a function of λ, the right-hand side of (B.17) is maximal when both functions coincide,


































Finally, if ψ ≥ 2αθ and ψ ≥ α(3/2 − θ), the left-hand side in this inequality is negative
because both terms inside the “min” are negative. Since β∞ > 0, this side of the inequality is









θR < H∞ +R
which is always true since θ ≤ 1 and H∞ > 0 by assumption. Therefore, these conditions
ψ ≥ 2αθ and ψ ≥ α(3/2− θ) are sufficient for local stability. They are equivalent respectively
to θ ≤ b/(αc1) and θ ≥ (3− 2b/(αc1))/4.
B.3 Feedback strategies and profits
Consider the model specified by (3.3), where we only take into account the objective instan-
taneous gain and we assume symmetry, namely,




2 − wi (c0 − c1[H − θ(R− α(wi + wj)])) .
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Assume that the dynamics are given by (3.1), and consider that both players play the same
state-feedback strategy of the form:
wti = ν1H
t + ν0 .
As observed in Section 4.3, this is the situation for the full-information schemes, and in that
case parameters ν0 depend linearly on γ whereas parameters ν1 do not depend on γ.
Then the total discounted objective gain, for each player, and the steady state of stock H
and consumption w of this strategy are:
V ν0,ν1(H0) =
ν1 (H0 −H∞)2
1− ρ (1− 2αν1)2
(
c1 −






1− ρ (1− 2αν1)
[




















This is a quadratic and convex function of H0, since it is expected that the leading term
c1− ν1(4αc1θ+ b)/2 is positive. This is also a quadratic function of H∞. The leading term is:
A2 =
ν1
1− ρ (1− 2αν1)2
(
c1 −














1− ρ (1− 2αν1)2
.
This leading term is therefore negative, and the gain function is concave as a function of H∞.
Since H∞ is linear in ν0, V is quadratic and concave as well, as a function of ν0.
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